Irresistible to pun lovers and self-styled comedians, the words “space law” can elicit a variety of reactions: curiosity, humor, or even confusion. Upon telling fellow Army professionals of my plans to study space law, I would often hear a version of the following response: “Oh, space law! So you’re going to learn how to court-martial Spock?” (or Worf or, occasionally, ALF). As hilarious as the references are contemporary, the good-natured ribbing—from both within and outside the judge advocate legal services community—reflects a general knowledge gap regarding the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army’s reliance on space assets and the scope of associated legal issues. But, from the creation of the United States Space Command to the nascent Space Force, the space domain’s role in national defense is rapidly expanding. National security professionals who understand the broad principles of space law and related implications on military operations are better-suited to serve Army and DoD clients. This article aims to provide that foundation through a brief discussion of space law’s fundamental rules and the related national security law implications.
What Space Law Is—and Is Not
Space law’s definition depends upon how broadly one views the field. In the narrowest sense, it is limited to the body of international law that addresses outer space directly. This consists of four widely-subscribed treaties from the 1960s and 1970s, colloquially known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) (1967),1 the Rescue Agreement (1968),2 the Liability Convention (1972),3 and the Registration Convention (1975).4 These agreements, along with other equities and interests, led states to develop various domestic legal controls. This added regulation gives rise to space law’s broader definition: every legal regime with a significant impact on at least one type of space activity. The broader definition thus includes both international law and domestic statutory and regulatory regimes with topics ranging from telecommunications5 to export control6 to space resource mining.7
Space law is not maritime or air law “higher up.” The analogy is tempting: the high seas and air above them are, like space, areas used by states yet the sovereign territory of none. Some legal principles from space law even appear to be the same, with the law of the flag conferring jurisdiction to a state for its vessels on the high seas and Article VIII of the OST accomplishing a corollary function for manmade objects in outer space.8 These comparisons, however, are misleading for several reasons.
Chief among the distinctions between air and maritime law and space law relates to responsibility. In all regimes, states are obligated to ensure vessels or objects under their registration comply with and conform to international law.9 Unique to space law, however, is that states bear international responsibility and financial liability for internationally wrongful acts or damage resulting from their national activities in outer space—including those produced by non-governmental entities.10 In other words, while a state is obligated to ensure those conducting activities under color of its authority are compliant with international law in all domains, it faces significantly greater consequences11 for its nationals’ noncompliance under space law.
Physical differences between the domains can significantly affect these legal issues. If two ships or aircraft were to get too close to each other in a contested situation in their respective domains, the worst-case scenario includes damaged property, environmental damage, and potentially injuries or even limited loss of life. While these consequences are serious, they are largely contained and relatively discrete (both temporally and geographically).12 If two satellites were to collide—and recent reporting on Russian satellite activities shows this is a distinct possibility13—the debris could prove hazardous for years as it continues to orbit the earth. This poses risks to completely unrelated space objects, including some that are not even launched at the time of the incident.14 Considered in the context of the unique responsibility and liability obligations mentioned above and described in greater detail below, the risks of analogizing law of the air or sea domains directly to space become more apparent. Specifically, a private satellite operator’s negligence producing a collision in outer space (or even losing control of the object due to technical failures) could cause financial uncertainty for that state indefinitely as the remnants of that satellite remain in orbit.
Another way space physics affects legal analysis is in the proportionality rule of the law of armed conflict, which prohibits attacks when the expected loss of life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.15 In space, due to long-lasting debris, the expected damage from any kinetic strike is extremely difficult to forecast; this complicates the assessment. Moreover, the potential that long-lasting debris may interfere with future operations is an important practical consideration for commanders.
In sum, space is different and far too much so to extrapolate the law of the sea or air law directly. From the legal perspective, all of its rules developed in a world that is post-United Nations (U.N.) Charter. As a result, there is an amplified role for states in the supervision of activities undertaken there. Physically, space lacks borders and objects behave differently there. Accordingly, many legal principles will yield different results when applied in this domain.
Space Law and National Security
For the national security professional, the narrower definition of space law, discussed above, is most applicable and will thus be the basis of the rest of this article. Most of the principles relevant to military operations and other national security considerations are derived from the OST and elaborated in the other three major space treaties. The OST incorporates international law, including the U.N. Charter, into all activities in the exploration and use of outer space.16 Space law’s rules, then, must be read and understood in the broader context of other national security law—primarily the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.17 The following is a brief distillation of space law’s general principles with some illustrations of their impact on national security matters.
The Core Principles: Freedom of Use and Prohibition of Appropriation
The first principle of space law, often referred to as “freedom of use,” is articulated in Article I of the OST: outer space, including all celestial bodies, is free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind.18 Older than any of the space treaties, this principle arose in 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in an acquiescent response from the international community.19 Sputnik’s unprotested passage over other states marked a monumental change from the traditional ad coelum doctrine, which held that property had an infinite extension overhead.20 Freedom of use appears straightforward and analogous to the Lotus Principle, which holds that states may conduct any activity not specifically prohibited by treaty or custom.21 The national security significance of free use becomes more apparent when considered in the context of the next principle, the prohibition on national appropriation. This principle holds that no portion of space or any celestial body is subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or any other means.22 These rules produce a natural tension: states are generally free to operate as they see fit in outer space, but are limited in protecting assets because they cannot exclude others from occupying positions deemed threatening (i.e., are unable to claim territorial sovereignty). This creates potential for conflict.
The reported 2018 encounter between Russian and French satellites illustrates both this tension and the primacy of the free use principle. In that instance, French officials alleged that a Russian satellite maneuvered to and operated in close proximity to a French satellite.23 The French government characterized the actions as espionage. This moniker carries legal significance because espionage is not prohibited under international law, even if states regularly condemn it when discovered.24 The freedom of use and non-appropriation principles left the French government without any legal recourse, perhaps leading them to choose public condemnation as a response. In other words, France could characterize the Russian satellite maneuvering as irresponsible, but not illegal. Importantly, the United States has articulated favoring freedom of use since the earliest days with President Eisenhower reportedly viewing the Sputnik’s successful launch as a partial victory because it confirmed the principle in international law.25
The freedom of use rule differs from air law, which is governed by a separate rule structure relying in part on territory. This raises the question: where does territorial air space end and outer space legally begin? Two methods to answering this question dominate the discussion: spatialism and functionalism. The spatialist approach proposes a particular altitude (typically 100 kilometers above sea level) as constituting outer space and, therefore, governed by space law. Anything below such a level is subject to air law. Proponents of this approach argue that a clear delineation will make rules easier to follow and enforce. The functional approach argues that the purpose or use of the object under analysis—whether to operate in outer space or to be used in the earth’s atmosphere—should govern which law applies. Functional supporters note that some space objects can enter into relatively low orbits and that all space objects begin movement with a negligible altitude, meaning different legal regimes would apply to the same object at different stages of its use (or even different points of an orbit). The overwhelming majority of state practice—including that of the United States—is to follow the functional approach, declaring that any object in orbit is in outer space.26
The next few principles of space law apply directly to military operations. The first principles restrict the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Specifically, stationing WMD in outer space (or installing them upon any celestial body) is prohibited.27 Such weapons transiting through outer space, however, is not prohibited by this rule. Nuclear explosions of any kind in outer space—an event with exceptionally hazardous consequences on the earth’s surface28—are also prohibited during peacetime.29
The next principles relate to the moon and other celestial bodies. The OST states that these may only be used for “peaceful purposes.”30 While the scope of this term is subject to some debate, the majority view (and that held by the United States) is that this term prohibits aggression, but not military measures taken for defensive posture.31 This interpretation is potentially critical for space entrepreneurs’ plans to harvest resources from celestial bodies. Recalling the freedom of use and non-appropriation principles above, protecting equipment and facilities of states, or their juridical persons conducting such activities, may well prove to be such a peaceful purpose.32
Another rule with potential direct implication on military space operations is the declaration of astronauts as “envoys of mankind.”33 This title confers special quasi-diplomatic status and includes a pledge (at least among parties to the Rescue Agreement) to return the astronauts safely to their state of nationality if found within a member state’s territory.34 Many astronauts are military officers, which raises a number of questions in the event of an armed conflict. The legal answers to these questions will rely upon fairly traditional analysis of protected status (and loss thereof); but, depending on the nature of and parties to the conflict in question, the policy implications are potentially very complex.35
Unicorn of International Law: State Responsibility for Private Activities in Space
One of the most unique features of space law is how it addresses state responsibility. Born of Soviet opposition to (and some may say suspicion of) American enthusiasm for private activities in space,36 the general rule is that states are internationally responsible for “national activities” in outer space, whether conducted by governmental or non-governmental actors.37 This is a marked departure from the general rule that states are only internationally responsible for the actions of government organs or private actors under the state’s “effective control.”38 The scope of the phrase “national activities in outer space” is not defined in any treaty; but, state practice—including that of the United States—is to view this broadly. Thus, all space activities conducted from their territory—and those carried on by their nationals—are regulated.39
The unusual responsibility rule in space law raises three critical points for practitioners to understand. First, the term “space activities” includes all actions associated with the operation of a space object, regardless of whether they occur on the earth’s surface, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. The majority of actions to control and otherwise utilize satellites are conducted by humans from the earth’s surface, meaning the term’s applicability is broader than it may appear at first blush (i.e., it applies on the earth’s surface as well as in outer space). Second, beware conflating international responsibility for wrongful acts with attribution. Doing so implies that, if a space object is used to conduct what would amount to an armed attack, a private actor from State A could initiate an international armed conflict with State B—regardless of whether State A’s government exercised any control over the private actor.40 Such an interpretation is contrary to the U.N. Charter’s purpose of maintaining international peace and security.41 The final takeaway is that states are obligated to require authorization and continuing supervision of their national activities in outer space. Thus, as mentioned above, states tend to maximize jurisdiction and control over anything that could be considered their national activities.42
As the private commercial participation in space activities increases, these responsibility rules can raise some interesting questions. Some of these questions are straightforward, such as the lawful targeting of privately-owned equipment in the event of an armed conflict. Simply put, in the event of an armed conflict, commercial satellites that provide services to a government entity are lawful “dual use” targets by an enemy—if they provide an effective contribution to military action.43 Other questions are much more difficult. One of them relates to the law of neutrality, which—in order to retain protection from the conflict’s effects—generally obligates neutral states to refrain from participating in hostilities; but, it imposes no such restriction on neutral states’ nationals.44 Would neutral state nationals enjoy this greater leeway in providing space-based services to belligerents to an armed conflict—such as earth imaging or satellite communications? Or would space law’s unique state responsibility for such activities mean the prohibition on participation applies? This question is currently unsettled in international law but may be of growing importance as governments—including militaries—are increasingly using commercial space services.45
A corollary to international responsibility for national activities in outer space is that states also bear financial liability for damage caused by space objects.46 The general rule creates a two track system: launching states are strictly liable for damage to persons or property occurring on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft in flight, while liability for damage or injury in space is fault-based.47 Straightforward in concept, these rules have remained untested as a matter of international law. In 1978, when a nuclear-powered Russian satellite crashed in Canada, questions arose as to whether environmental harm constitutes “damage” on earth.48 Determining fault for damage caused in outer space is even murkier. International space traffic management rules do not exist; there is no right of way in orbit. Moreover, establishing underlying facts of any collision in outer space is fraught with challenges. These rules drive substantial insurance requirements as part of the licensing process.
The authority to uphold these responsibilities are provided by Article VIII of the OST and the Registration Convention, which provides that each space object must be registered to one state, which will then maintain jurisdiction and control over the object. The registration principle is one of authority, not transparency. These rules are meant to ensure that no space object can be stateless, providing at least some mechanism to identify a responsible or liable state to enforce those corollary rules. Registration is not, however, a transparency measure. The only information required is identifying; its capabilities need not be described.49
Together, these rules are important for national security practitioners to understand. This system—and particularly the ambiguous term “national activities in outer space”—incentivizes states to maximize oversight for space-related activities conducted from their territory or by their nationals. The physical requirements to operate constellations of satellites often requires a series of stations around the globe for control functions.50 The result is that several states may have international obligations (responsibility or financial liability) at stake for any given satellite constellation. As militaries increasingly use commercially-provided space services, these equities must be carefully considered from acquisition onward. Planners must account for other states’ obligations generally, as in the event of a collision, and how these obligations may change in the event of an armed conflict.
Principles of Cooperation
The remaining principles are aimed at a cooperative approach to the use and exploration of outer space. One such principle is the obligation for states to conduct their activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states.51 To facilitate this cooperation, states are obligated to seek consultation with others when they suspect planned activities (by the state or its nationals) may potentially cause harmful interference with the activities of another state.52 Similarly, states have a right to request consultation if they believe the activities of another state (or that state’s nationals) might cause harmful interference to its own activities.53 This is a relatively narrow principle because it does not provide for a dispute resolution mechanism.
A recent example demonstrates both the purpose and limitations of this rule. In February 2020, U.S. officials disclosed concerns of a Russian satellite maneuvering near one of its satellites.54 According to reports, the United States sought to address this through diplomatic channels.55 If the United States perceived the Russian satellite’s actions may cause harmful interference (e.g., potential for collision or interrupting the satellite’s control), space law would guarantee a right to request consultations with the Russian government. Should the Russian government not agree with the assessment that these actions pose the risk of harmful interference, however, space law does not currently provide for any means to resolve the difference. This principle may seem of little utility, but some have recently suggested its use as a basis for establishing some norms in the realm of space traffic management. Specifically, this rule may serve as a basis for states to establish physical zones around space objects (e.g., 15 kilometers), and declare that operation by another space object in such zone (without consultation) as constituting potential harmful interference.56 Under this approach, the potential harmful interference grants a right to request consultation from the state responsible for the other space object). This may prove to be a solution to the friction described above between the principles of freedom of use and prohibited sovereignty in space.
Three other rules on cooperation round out the principles of space law. First, states are obligated to consider requests to observe the flight of space objects.57 This rule is generally unused and was meant to facilitate reciprocity in extraterritorial construction of tracking facilities.58 Next, the OST obligates states to share the “nature, conduct, locations, and results” of scientific studies conducted in space.59 This rule’s weight is significantly limited, however, by the caveat that states must only do this insofar as it is feasible and practicable.60 Lastly, the OST requires “stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies” to be open to representatives from other state parties on a basis of reciprocity with reasonable advance notice.61 This rule may prove of increasing importance as both the United States62 and China63 have plans to build research stations on the moon in the next decade.
The rules discussed here are drawn from a body of international law designed to harmonize the use and exploration of outer space and celestial bodies. These constitute an agreement amongst parties (many have argued among all states as customary international law)64 on conduct related to space activities. The above examples provide context for some of the ways these rules may affect matters of national security in peacetime and conflict. Difficult questions exist beyond the scope of this article, and many more will arise as technology and use of space continues to develop. As policies evolve and norms mature to account for these changes, national security professionals will benefit from understanding the bedrock principles described above, particularly those related to freedom of use, appropriation, and responsibility. Interpretations may evolve and change—particularly when considered in the context of an armed conflict—but the rules are likely to remain, constituting the bedrock for international law of the space domain.65 TAL
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 6, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. A fifth treaty, The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, exists, but has only been ratified by five states and is thus generally not considered part of the body of space law.
2. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 673 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
3. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
4. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
5. International Telecommunications Convention and Optional Protocol, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, TIAS 8572.
6. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
7. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
8. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII.
9. See Convention on Civil Aviation art. 12, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
10. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, arts. VI and VII.
11. I.e., international responsibility and financial liability.
12. The 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy and Chinese naval aircraft is a prime example. While the event was significant for U.S.-Chinese relations, its effects were relatively localized and short-lived. See Shirley A. Kan et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications (2001).
13. See Chelsea Gohd, 2 Russian Satellites are Stalking a US Spysat in Orbit. The Space Force is Watching, Space.com (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.space.com/russian-spacecraft-stalking-us-spy-satellite-space-force.html (quoting officials describing Russian satellite operations proximate to United States assets as “dangerous”). See also infra, note 22 .
14. David Wright et al., The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual 22 (2005).
15. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 57(2)(a)(iii), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP 1].
16. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. III.
17. The two general categories of the law of war are jus ad bellum (the law concerning the use of force) and the jus in bello (the law of conduct during a war). See U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD Law of War Manual para. 1.11 (May 2016) [hereinafter Law of War Manual].
18. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
19. See Memorandum of Conference with the President (Oct. 8, 1957, 8:30 AM), https://www.archives.gov/files/education/lessons/sputnik-memo/ [hereinafter Sputnik Memorandum].
20. Vladen S. Vereshchetin, Outer Space, in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2006).
21. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
23. Angelique Chrisafis, ‘Act of Espionage’: France Accuses Russia of Trying to Spy on Satellite Data, Guardian (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/france-accuses-russia-spying-satellite-communications-espionage.
24. Christian Schaller, Spies, in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2015).
25. See Sputnik Memorandum, supra note 19.
26. Law of War Manual, supra note 17, para. 14.2.2.
27. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
28. Gilbert King, Going Nuclear Over the Pacific, Smithsonian Mag., (Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/going-nuclear-over-the-pacific-24428997.
29. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty), opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963).
30. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
31. Law of War Manual, supra note 17, para. 14.10.4.
32. Theresa Hitchens, WH Woos Potential Allies, Including China, for Space Mining, Breaking Def. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/wh-woos-potential-allies-including-china-for-space-mining.
33. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. V.
34. Rescue Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.
35. Law of War Manual, supra note 17, para. 12.5.
36. Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. Air L. & Com., 419, 437-38 (1967).
37. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI.
38. Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001), https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 ¶ 115 (June 27).
39. Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law 658-59 (1997).
40. Generally, states are only internationally responsible for the acts of their organs or those acting pursuant to the state’s effective control. See sources cited supra note 38.
41. U.N. Charter art. I.
42. Cheng, supra note 39.
43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. While many states (including the United States) are not parties to this treaty, the provision related to defining a military objective as described above is accepted as customary international law. See Law of War Manual, supra note 17, paras. 5.6.3, 126.96.36.199.
44. Compare Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War art. 6, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 [hereinafter Hague XIII] (prohibiting neutral states from directly or indirectly providing war material to belligerents) with Hague XIII art. 7 (explicitly exempting states from preventing the export of the same). The only logical conclusion that these articles presents is that a neutral state providing such material would violate its duty of non-participation, but that its juridical persons or nationals providing the same material is not considered state participation. See also Law of War Manual, supra note 17, para. 188.8.131.52 (noting that “[c]ommercial transactions between belligerent States and neutral corporations, companies, citizens, or persons resident in a neutral State are not prohibited”).
45. See Charles Beames, Why Hybrid Systems Will Enable The United States’ Future, Forbes (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlesbeames/2019/11/29/why-hybrid-systems-will-enable-the-united-states-space-future/ (citing reports that the space economy will be a multi-trillion-dollar industry in the next thirty years).
46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VII.
48. The Dangers of Cosmos 954, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1978, at A24.
49. Registration Convention, supra note 4, art. IV.
50. For example, the European Space Agency’s position, navigation, and timing satellite constellation, GALILEO, uses six such stations distributed around the globe to ensure coverage. GALILEO Ground Segment, European Space Agency, https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php/Galileo_Architecture#GALILEO_Ground_Segment.
51. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX.
54. Gohd, supra note 13.
56. Lieutenant Commander Mark T. Rasmussen, National Security Zones in Outer Space (May 6, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For example, State A could announce that it perceives any space object operating within 15 kilometers of its space objects without coordination as constituting potential harmful interference. Thus, if State A’s space domain monitoring indicated that a space object belonging to State B was projected to operating inside that zone, State A has a basis under the OST to request consultation with State B.
57. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. X.
58. Dembling & Arons, supra note 36, at 442-44.
59. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. XI.
61. Id. art. XII.
62. Meghan Bartels, NASA Unveils Plans for Artemis ‘Base Camp’ on the Moon Beyond 2024, Space.com (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.space.com/nasa-plans-artemis-moon-base-beyond-2024.html.
63. Rafi Letzter, China Plans to Build a Moon Base, Wash. Post (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/china-plans-to-build-a-moon-base/2019/04/26/d22406f2-6768-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html.
64. F.G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, in 6 Studies in Space Law 3 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2011).
65. See Law of War Manual, supra note 17, para. 1.3.2 (describing the law of armed conflict’s relationship with other bodies of international law).